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I. Introduction 
An unfailing commitment to protect public health and 
safety, security, and the environment is essential to 
ensuring that nuclear power remains part of our diversified 
clean-energy portfolio. As part of that commitment, safe, 
long-term management and disposal of used nuclear fuel 
and high-level radioactive waste must remain a national 
priority.1 
Discussions about long-term nuclear waste storage date back to the 
1950s. Now, the dialogue contains threads of urgency as nuclear waste 
continues to accumulate at nuclear power plants across the country. 
Although the federal government officially endorsed a site for the 
permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel in 2002,2 the government cut 
federal funding for the site’s development less than ten years later.3 Since 
that time, the federal government has not adopted an alternative option to 
meet the nation’s nuclear waste storage needs.4 
 On January 11, 2013, the Department of Energy (DOE) selected 
2048 as the target date to open a permanent site to receive nuclear waste.5 
This date comes 50 years later than the original target date of 1998.6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Steven Chu, Preface to U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT 
& DISPOSAL OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL & HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE (2013) 




 2.  See JAMES M. INHOFE, S. COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS, YUCCA 
MOUNTAIN: THE MOST STUDIED REAL ESTATE ON THE PLANET, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, at 
9 (2006), available at http://epw.senate.gov/repwhitepapers/YuccaMountainEPWReport.pdf 
(indicating Congressional and Presidential approval of the Yucca Mountain repository 
development program).  
 3. See Matthew L. Wald, Future Dim For Nuclear Waste Repository, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 6, 2009, at A1 (revealing that President Obama’s 2009 budget proposal reduced much 
of the funding for the Yucca Mountain project) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 4. Although members of Congress have discussed possible solutions and the 
Administration has released its recommendations, Congress has not adopted an official plan 
for the permanent storage of nuclear waste.  
 5.  See Steve Tetreault, DOE Sets New Nuclear Waste Target Date, LAS VEGAS 
REV. J. (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.lvrj.com/news/doe-new-target-date-for-a-nuclear-
repository-is-2048-186542641.html (recounting the DOE’s statement that it intend s to have 
a site open to receive nuclear waste by 2048) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 6.  See id. (listing the past and present target dates for opening a nuclear waste site).  
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Although this date signals progress toward achieving a permanent solution 
for nuclear waste storage, the Administration and Congress must overcome 
disagreements and challenges that caused past setbacks and delays.7   
 Part II of this Note provides an overview of the importance of 
nuclear energy in the United States, defines nuclear waste, describes the 
process by which the nuclear waste is currently stored, and reveals the 
financial costs of not developing a permanent storage site. Part III of this 
Note examines the United States’ process for selecting and developing a 
permanent storage site, summarizes two federal court opinions relating to 
nuclear waste storage, and discusses several factors that caused the eventual 
cessation of repository development in Nevada. Part IV of this Note 
reviews recent congressional and administrative proposals for interim and 
permanent storage of nuclear waste. Part V of this Note discusses some of 
the issues that Congress should address in drafting nuclear waste storage 
legislation. Part V also reveals the importance of gaining public support for 
a storage site.   
 This Note ultimately contends that Congress and the 
Administration must agree on a plan to develop both interim and permanent 
nuclear waste storage options and should consider reopening the Yucca 
Mountain program. Further delay on the development of the long-overdue 
repository will continue to cost the federal government, utilities, and utility 
customers billions of dollars.8 Further delay will also threaten the ability of 
the nuclear industry to expand and build new plants,9 and it will pose health 
risks to the human environment.10 This Note provides the requisite 
background information for understanding the nuclear waste storage 
problem. Specifically, this Note will focus on the storage of spent nuclear 
fuel from commercial reactor sites in the United States. Unless indicated 




                                                                                                                 
 7.  See id. (referencing the termination of the Yucca Mountain repository 
development by President Obama in 2010 and Senator Harry Reid’s persistent opposition to 
the development of a nuclear waste disposal site in Nevada).  
 8. See JAMES D. WERNER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42513, U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR 
FUEL STORAGE 7 (May 24, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42513.pdf 
(revealing that the federal government has paid $1 billion in breach of contract claims and 
will likely pay more if a permanent storage solution is not developed). 
 9. See id. at 8 (indicating the storage issue could negatively affect the industry and 
reduce expansion). 
 10. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-797, SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL: 
ACCUMULATING QUANTITIES AT COMMERCIAL REACTORS PRESENT STORAGE & OTHER 
CHALLENGES, Highlights (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593745.pdf 
(revealing potential health risks associated with long-term on-site spent nuclear fuel storage).  
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II. Nuclear Energy in the United States 
 
A.  Summary of Nuclear Energy Production and Environmental Benefits 
 
 Nuclear power plays a vital role in America’s energy sector 
because it generates a substantial amount of electricity each year. Currently, 
104 nuclear reactors are operating 24 hours a day in 31 states.11 Each year 
the reactors produce about 20 percent of all electricity generated in the 
United States.12 In Connecticut, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia, nuclear energy produces more 
electricity than any other source.13 By 2035, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration projects that the demand for electricity will rise by 22 
percent in the United States.14 America must keep nuclear energy in the mix 
of energy sources to generate sufficient amounts of electricity to meet the 
nation’s growing energy needs.15  
 Nuclear energy also provides clean-air benefits.16 Nuclear energy 
generation does not release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and 
accounts for more than 75 percent of the carbon-free energy produced in the 
United States.17 In 2010, the electricity generated by nuclear power plants, 
as opposed to fossil fuel powered plants, prevented the release of nearly 
650 million metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.18 This 
reduction in emission is significant because electricity generation in the 
United States generally produces and emits more carbon dioxide than both 
transportation and industry.19 Nuclear power provides an essential amount 
                                                                                                                 
 11.  NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, NEW NUCLEAR ENERGY FACILITIES WILL SUPPORT 
GROWTH, PROVIDE CLEAN ELECTRICITY (2012) [hereinafter New Facilities] 
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/reliableandaffordableenergy/factsheet
/usneedsnewplants (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment); see also U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NUCLEAR REACTORS: NRC 
REACTOR INSPECTION EFFORTS 30 (2012–13), available at 
http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/Need_for_New_Plants_April_2012.pdf 
(noting the number of commercial nuclear power reactors licensed to operate in the United 
States as of August 2012).  
 12.  New Facilities, supra note 12.  
 13.  See New Facilities, supra note 12 (looking at nationwide nuclear energy 
production statistics and comparing Connecticut, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Virginia, Vermont, and South Carolina with the rest of the country). 
 14.  New Facilities, supra note 12.  
 15.  See New Facilities, supra note 12 (recognizing that a “diverse mix of energy 
sources enables America to balance the cost of electricity production”).  
 16.  See New Facilities, supra note 12 (revealing that nuclear power plants are a 
“clean-air energy source[]”).  
 17.  New Facilities, supra note 12.   
 18. New Facilities, supra note 12.  
 19.  See Ernest J. Moniz, Why We Still Need Nuclear Power, MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, 
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://mitei.mit.edu/news/mitei-news/why-we-still-need-nuclear-power 
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of electricity in an ozone friendly manner, and the United States must 
ensure the longevity of this viable power source.   
 
B.  Defining Nuclear Waste 
 
 What many people commonly refer to as “nuclear waste” is more 
accurately termed spent nuclear fuel.20 This ‘spent fuel’ results from nuclear 
reactors using low-enriched uranium as fuel in the nuclear fission process to 
generate electricity.21 The steam produced from the heat of the fission 
process turns a turbine generator, which in turn generates electricity.22 The 
amount of uranium used during this process is about the size of a pellet that 
a person can hold between her index finger and thumb.23 A single metal 
casing, called a fuel rod, contains one of these uranium pellets.24 Multiple 
fuel rods are bound together to compose a collective group called a fuel 
assembly.25 A single fuel rod generally lasts 54 months, and utilities 
typically rotate assemblies as fuel rods ‘burn up.’26 About every 18 months, 
a plant replaces nearly one-third of its used fuel assemblies with new 
assemblies.27 The “replaced fuel assembly becomes spent nuclear fuel when 
it has been irradiated and removed from a nuclear reactor after it is no 
longer cost-effective to generate power.”28 A typical fuel rod assembly 
operates for about four and a half years before being replaced and stored.29  
 Once removed from the reactor, the fuel rods are placed on “racks 
within deep, water-filled pools for cooling and to protect workers from 
radiation.”30 After the spent nuclear fuel cools, it can be placed in dry cask 
                                                                                                                 
(indicating that electricity generation accounts for a greater emission of carbon dioxide than 
transportation or industry) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, 
and the Environment).  
 20.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 9 (realizing that the term nuclear waste is often used 
instead of spent nuclear fuel, although the latter is more specific).  
 21.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 10 (explaining that low-enriched uranium is used in 
nuclear fission in commercial reactors).  
 22.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 10 (detailing the process by which the nuclear fission 
produces heat to rotate the turbine generator to create electricity).  
 23.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 10 (indicating that a single “uranium pellet” fits 
inside a single fuel rod).  
 24.  Werner, supra note 9, at 10.  
 25.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 10 (explaining that a fuel assembly is composed of 
multiple fuel rods containing uranium and providing an illustration).  
 26.  Werner, supra note 9, at 10.  
 27.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 10 (indicating that about every “18 months, utilities 
generally conduct a refueling outage in which approximately one-third of the fuel assemblies 
are replaced with new assemblies”).   
 28.  Werner, supra note 9, at 10.  
 29.  Werner, supra note 9, at 10.  
 30.  See New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (summarizing the 
process by which spent fuel is removed from the reactor and stored on-site).  
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storage.31 The majority of spent fuel, however, remains in storage pools 
awaiting a permanent disposal option.32 Generally, both the dry casks and 
storage pools are located on the same site as the nuclear reactors, and they 
are typically referred to as “on-site storage” options. 
 Even after the spent nuclear fuel is removed from the reactor, it 
continues to produce radiation, and some reports contend that the spent fuel 
necessitates cautious management for thousands of years.33 The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed studies that 
determined that radiation releases from a storage site could “harm human 
health or the environment”34 and have dangerous consequences.35 Although 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reassured the federal 
government that the possibility of a radiation leak is low, the longer the 
spent nuclear fuel rests on sites created for temporary storage, the greater 
the potential for radiation releases.36 To avoid the health and environmental 
risks of storing the spent nuclear fuel on plant sites beyond the intended 
period, the federal government must provide a permanent storage facility to 
receive the waste. 
 
C.  The Facts Behind On-site Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
 
 On-site spent fuel storage is nearing capacity and has exceeded 
pool capacity at some reactor sites,37 making the need for a permanent 
                                                                                                                 
 31.  See id. (indicating that spent fuel must be cooled before being placed in dry 
storage casks); see also, Werner, supra note 9, at 15 (explaining that dry casks are generally 
“in a cylindrical shape with an inner steel canister directly storing the [spent nuclear fuel] 
assemblies that is bolted or welded closed in an outer concrete cask” and “once constructed, 
filled, and sealed, they require no power for circulation of cooling water and are generally 
regarded as ‘passively safe’”).  
 32.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 10 (reflecting that most spent fuel remains in pools 
until a permanent storage option is available).  
 33.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 10–11 (cautioning that the removed spent nuclear fuel 
still emits heat and radiation and “requires careful management for thousands of years).  
 34. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-797, SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL: 
ACCUMULATING QUANTITIES AT COMMERCIAL REACTORS PRESENT STORAGE & OTHER 
CHALLENGES, Highlights (Aug. 2012), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593745.pdf.  
 35. See id. (including “widespread contamination, a significant increase in the 
probability of fatal cancer in the affect population, and the possibility of early fatalities”).  
 36.  See id. (recognizing that the “key risk posed by spent nuclear fuel involves a 
release of radiation”). 
 37. See Fact Sheet on Dry Cask Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, NUCLEAR ENERGY 
INSTITUTE (Feb. 2013), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dry-cask-
storage.html (“[T]he spent fuel generated at many nuclear power plants has exceeded spent 
fuel pool capacity.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and 
the Environment); see also, Nuclear Waste: Amounts & On-Site Storage, NUCLEAR ENERGY 
INSTITUTE 
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/nuclear_statistics/nuclearwasteamountsandonsitestorag
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repository or other alternative imminent. The GAO published a report in 
August 2012, which examined the amount of spent fuel currently stored on-
site and the amount expected to accumulate before it can be transported 
from nuclear reactor sites to a permanent storage site.38 The GAO 
discovered that about 74 percent of spent nuclear fuel is stored in pools of 
water while the remaining 26 percent is stored in dry storage casks.39 These 
storage facilities span 33 states and account for nearly 70,000 metric tons of 
spent fuel.40 The GAO determined that the amount of spent fuel stored on-
site would increase annually by 2,000 metric tons.41 Because a permanent 
disposal facility may take between 15 and 40 years to construct, the GAO 
estimated that the current amount of spent fuel could increase to 140,000 
metric tons before it could be transported to an off-site repository.42 This 
growing dilemma illustrates the importance of developing an alternative 
storage option to on-site storage as soon as possible.  
 The large accumulation of spent nuclear fuel makes the 
development of a permanent solution more difficult. For example, the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), which will be discussed in more detail 
in Part II, set a numerical limit on the amount of nuclear waste that a 
permanent storage site, such as a geologic repository,43 can receive.44 The 
NWPA prohibits an initial repository from receiving more than 70,000 
metric tons of radioactive waste until a second repository begins receiving 
waste.45 Congress also required that 90 percent of the waste received by the 
repository be commercial spent fuel, and Congress reserved the remaining 
10 percent of storage space for DOE spent nuclear fuel, such as naval spent 
nuclear fuel.46 Currently, commercial nuclear reactors store nearly 70,000 
metric tons of spent nuclear fuel on-site, and this number does not account 
                                                                                                                 
e/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2013) (recognizing need for alternative storage options) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 38. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35 (highlighting the amount 
of nuclear waste that will accumulate before it can be transported to a permanent off-site 
storage site).  
 39. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35. 
 40. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35. 
 41. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35. 
 42. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35 (estimating that a nuclear 
waste repository will take between 15 to 40 years to construct, allowing the spent nuclear 
fuel in the United States to increase to about 140,000 metric tons).  
 43.  This is the most preferable permanent storage option and will be discussed in Part 
II of this Note.  
 44.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 5 (describing the dilemma posed by the large amount 
of spent fuel and the amount of waste that a repository is legally allowed to receive under the 
NWPA).  
 45.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 5.   
 46.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 5 (indicating that a repository must accept both 
commercial and government spent nuclear fuel).  
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for the DOE spent fuel.47 These storage amounts exceed the congressional 
limit placed on the amount of waste a single repository can receive.   
 In order to solve this problem, Congress must draft legislation that 
provides for multiple storage sites and/or raises the limit of radioactive 
waste that a repository may receive.48 The DOE examined the potential 
capacity at a previously selected site for a nuclear repository, Yucca 
Mountain,49 and determined that the site could receive more than 70,000 
metric tons, should Congress decide to raise the nuclear waste limit.50 The 
fact remains, however, that the United States has not developed or opened a 
permanent storage site to receive any amount of nuclear waste. The federal 
government must design and develop a geologic repository and interim 
storage options as soon as possible to ensure that the nuclear power plants 
do not exceed a storage capacity that endangers human health and the 
environment.  
 
D.  The Financial Cost of Not Developing a Permanent Storage Site 
 
 Aside from public safety and environmental concerns, the federal 
government faces significant legal liability for failing to receive nuclear 
waste from commercial reactors under the 1982 NWPA.51 The government 
has already paid about $1 billion in response to breach of contract claims 
regarding its failure to provide storage for spent nuclear fuel on commercial 
reactor sites.52 The projected costs for the annual storage of spent nuclear 
fuel are about $500 million.53 Delaying the development of interim and 
permanent storage facilities will continue to cost the government billions of 
dollars.  
                                                                                                                 
 47.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 5 (stating that commercial reactors have 70,000 
metric tons of waste stored on-site that needs to be removed and the DOE has thousands of 
tons of spent fuel not accounted for in the 70,000).  
 48.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 5 (indicating that current amounts of spent nuclear 
fuel in the United States would fill the Yucca Mountain repository to the congressional limit 
necessitating a new repository or an increase in the limit of waste the repository is allowed to 
receive).  
 49.  Yucca Mountain will be discussed in Part III of the Note.  
 50.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 5–6 (realizing that Yucca Mountain can hold much 
more waste than the 70,000 metric ton limit).   
 51.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 7 (indicating the federal government’s liability under 
the NWPA for not opening a repository to receive spent nuclear fuel).  
 52.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 7 (revealing that the federal government has already 
paid $1 billion in breach of contract claims).  
 53.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 8 (estimating future costs of storing commercial spent 
nuclear fuel at $500 million per year).  
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 The failure to establish a nuclear waste storage facility also costs 
nuclear energy utilities and consumers billions of dollars.54 The NWPA 
mandated that utilities pay for nuclear waste disposal through a fee of 1.0 
mil per kilowatt-hour into a Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF) in order to 
subsidize the construction of a permanent waste disposal site.55 Utilities 
have passed these fees on to their energy consumers, or ratepayers.56 The 
fees paid into the NWF exceeded $24 billion in 2010 with investment 
income, and projections indicated that the 2012 balance would exceed $28 
billion.57 Therefore, the federal government’s failure to development a plan 
for a permanent storage option unfairly prejudices both utilities and 
ratepayers who have paid and are paying fees into the NWF with the 
expectation that their money will be used for the construction of a waste 
storage site.  
 The uncertainty surrounding nuclear waste storage may also lead to 
a decline in the investment of new nuclear power plants, which could 
prevent the industry from expanding.58 An American Physical Society 
Panel, consisting of former NRC chairmen and a former Under Secretary of 
Energy, stated, “there is a concern that the buildup of spent fuel at reactor 
sites and lack of progress on final disposition could be serious constraints 
on the growth of the domestic nuclear power industry by discouraging 
investment in new nuclear power plants. . . .”59 Investments for new plants 
are not the only cause for concern because public support for expanding the 
nuclear industry may also fade without a workable “regime for disposing of 
our existing and future nuclear power wastes.”60  
 In its report submitted to the DOE, the Blue Ribbon Commission 
on America’s Nuclear Waste (BRC) stated, “this nation’s failure to come to 
grips with the nuclear waste issue has already proved damaging and costly 
                                                                                                                 
 54.  See Nat’l Association of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs v. DOE, 680 F.3d 819, 821–
22 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (indicating that, along with interest, ratepayers have paid over $24 
billion dollars into the NWF since the NWPA’s enactment). 
 55.  Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10222(c) (1982).  
 56.  Id.  
 57.  See Nat’l Association of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs, 680 F.3d at 821–22 
(indicating that the NWF totals over $24 billion and will exceed $28 billion by the end of 
2012).  
 58.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 8 (indicating that failing to solve the storage issue 
could negatively affect the industry).  
 59.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 8 (citing Am. Physical Soc’y Nuclear Energy Study 
Grp., Consolidated Interim Storage of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Technical and 
Programmatic Assessment, (Feb. 2007)).  
 60.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 8 (citing RICHARD B. STEWART & JANE B. STEWART, 
FUEL CYCLE TO NOWHERE: U.S. LAW & POLICY ON NUCLEAR WASTE (Vanderbilt Univ. 
Press 2011)).  
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and it will be more damaging and more costly the longer it continues. . . .”61
  
III.  An Overview of Permanent Waste Storage in the United States 
 
 The 1982 NWPA recognized that the disposal of nuclear waste was 
a national problem and provided a statutory framework for developing a 
permanent waste storage site.62 Specifically, the NWPA assigned the waste 
disposal responsibility to the federal government and assigned the cost of 
such disposal to nuclear utilities.63 The NWPA emphasized protection of 
public health, safety, and the environment for current and future 
generations.64 It “established a schedule for siting, construction, and 
operation of repositories” and “defined relationships between [f]ederal, 
[s]tate, and affected . . . local governments with regard to potential 
repositories.”65 The NWPA also assigned certain responsibilities to the 
President, Congress, and certain agencies.66 This legislation included all 
stakeholders and provided a feasible plan for resolving the nuclear waste 
storage problem.  
 The following sections provide an overview of the pre-NWPA 
storage initiatives, implementation of the NWPA, litigation surrounding the 
selection of Yucca Mountain as the permanent storage site, and the political 
decisions that derailed the development of Yucca Mountain.  
 
A.  A Chronology 
 
 In September 1955, the United States’ most distinguished scientists, 
known collectively as the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 67 met to 
                                                                                                                 
 61.  See Werner, supra note 9, at 8 (citing Blue Ribbon Comm’n on Am.’s Nuclear 
Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, vi (Jan. 26, 2012)).  
 62. See Philip Justus, Federal Laws: Responsibilities and Regulations for Geologic 
Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste in the U.S., U.S. N.R.C., 1, 8, (June 22, 2005), 
available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0515/ML051520482.pdf (revealing that the 
NWPA officially “established permanent disposal as a national policy”).  
 63. See id. (providing that the federal government must provide an option for waste 
disposal and that utilities pay for the storage).  
 64. See id. (“Public health, safety and the environment should be protected for this and 
future generations.”).  
 65. Id. at 9.  
 66. See id. (assigning responsibilities to DOE, EPA, NRC, DOI, the President and 
Congress).  
 67.  See James M. Inhofe, U.S. Senate Comm. on Env’t & Public Works Majority 
Staff, YUCCA MOUNTAIN: THE MOST STUDIED REAL ESTATE ON THE PLANET 1, 10 (Mar. 
2006), available at http://epw.senate.gov/repwhitepapers/YuccaMountainEPWReport.pdf 
(revealing that the “scientists met at Princeton University under the auspices of the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS)”).  
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discuss the potential for creating a method to dispose of radioactive waste.68 
In 1957, the NAS issued a report stating, “[t]he Committee is convinced 
that radioactive waste can be disposed of safely in a variety of ways and at 
a large number of sites in the United States.”69 Although scientists 
considered many options, “such as rocketing the material into space or 
disposing of it beneath the ocean floor,”70 scientists agreed that the disposal 
of radioactive material on land was the best option.71 Specifically, scientists 
determined that a geologic repository72 provided the requisite amount of 
safety to dispose of nuclear waste.73 
 The United States tried to develop a geologic repository in Lyons, 
Kansas in the 1960s, but due to technological issues, the government 
abandoned the project.74 In 1979, an Interagency Review Group suggested, 
“detailed studies of specific, potential repository sites in different geologic 
environments should begin immediately.”75 As a result, the DOE conducted 
a study, known as the 1980 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), to 
determine which type of repository was best suited for radioactive waste 
disposal.76 The DOE, like the NAS, concluded that the mined geologic 
repository provided the best solution.77  
 Based upon the DOE’s 1980 EIS, Congress passed the NWPA in 
198278 to create the “process for selecting and developing a geologic 
disposal site.”79 The NWPA gave the DOE “the responsibility to site, build, 
and operate a deep geologic repository for the disposal of high-level waste 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See id. at 4 (confirming that the nation’s best scientists met in 1955 to discuss 
options for radioactive waste disposal).    
 69. Id.  
 70.  Id.  
 71. See id. (“The land based disposal concept has been refined over time into a method 
known as deep geologic disposal and consensus support for this method has withstood many 
difficult challenges.”).  
 72. See Geological Repository, U.S. N.R.C. (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/geological-repository.html (defining a 
geological repository as “[a]n excavated, underground facility that is designed, constructed, 
and operated for safe and secure disposal of high-level radioactive waste”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee University Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 73.  See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 4 (determining that “a geologic repository is the 
generally accepted solution for management of long lived wastes in practically all countries 
faced by the problem”).   
 74. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 4. (abandoning site for “numerous technical 
reasons”).  
 75. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 4–5.   
 76. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5 (considering Very Deep Hole Waste Disposal, 
Rock Melt Waste Disposal, Island-based Geologic Disposal, Sub seabed Disposal, Ice Sheet 
Disposal, Well Injection Disposal, Transmutation, and Space Disposal as potential disposal 
options).   
 77. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5.  
 78. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (1982). 
 79.  Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5.  
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and spent nuclear fuel,”80 while giving the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) the task of creating general standards for protecting the 
environment from radioactive materials.81 The NWPA also assigned the 
NRC with the responsibility of licensing the DOE’s selected repository.82 In 
order to pay for the waste disposal, the NWPA created the Nuclear Waste 
Fund (NWF), which collected fees “from the consumers of nuclear 
electricity.”83 The collected fees were to be used to supplement the 
development of the repository.  
 In 1983, the DOE satisfied the first requirement of the NWPA by 
selecting nine potential repository sites in six states.84 Among the sites 
listed was Yucca Mountain in Nevada.85 The DOE evaluated the nine sites 
and used the results of the assessments to determine the five best sites for 
further consideration.86 Yucca Mountain remained one of the five.87  
 In 1986, the DOE published a document comparing the five sites 
and ranking them in order of the most preferred.88 The three highest ranked 
sites included Yucca Mountain, Deaf Smith County, Texas, and Hanford, 
Washington.89 Yucca Mountain proved to be the overall best location based 
upon a number of factors.90  
 Since passing the NWPA, the DOE spent $1.1 billion and 
performed five years of scientific research to determine the best site for a 
repository.91 Because this effort demonstrated that Yucca Mountain was the 
best site for the repository, Congress passed the 1987 Amendment to the 
NWPA, which instructed the “DOE to focus its site characterization studies 
                                                                                                                 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 10224; Laws and Regulations: Summary of the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act, U.S. E.P.A., available at http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-nuclear-
waste-policy-act (last visited Apr. 28, 2013).  
 81. 42 U.S.C. §10101 et seq.; see Laws and Regulations: Summary of the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act, U.S. E.P.A., available at http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-
nuclear-waste-policy-act (last visited Apr. 28, 2013) (reflecting that the NWPA direct the 
EPA to set environmental protection standards).   
 82.  42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270; see also, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10132–10135 (stating that the 
NRC is in charge of licensing the repository).  
 83. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5.   
 84. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5. 
 85. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5.  
 86. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5 (determining best potential repository sites 
according to the scientific and technical information gathered during research).     
 87. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5.     
 88. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5.      
 89.  Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5.     
 90. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 5 (stating that Yucca Mountain was best site for 
repository based upon geohydrology, geochemistry, rock characteristics, tectonics, 
meteorology, costs and socioeconomic impacts).  
 91. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 6 (stating the time and money invested in research 
and scientific study). 
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solely on Yucca Mountain.”92 The Amendment also offered the state of 
Nevada financial benefits if it waived its right to veto the selection of 
Yucca Mountain as the repository site.93 Nevada, however, retained its right 
to veto.  
 From 1987 until 2002, the DOE spent $3.8 billion performing 
studies on Yucca Mountain.94 During this time, the DOE completed a five-
mile tunnel through Yucca Mountain to serve as an Exploratory Study 
Facility and a two-mile tunnel to allow for experiments in the potential 
repository host rock.95 Both independent scientists and DOE scientists 
joined efforts to drill additional holes and conduct experiments and 
excavations at Yucca Mountain and similar sites around the world in order 
to better understand Yucca Mountain’s “ability to safely contain radioactive 
wastes.”96  
 In 1998, the DOE released the Viability Assessment of a Repository 
at Yucca Mountain,97 which concluded: 
Over 15 years, extensive research has validated many of 
the expectations of the scientists who first suggested that 
remote, desert regions of the Southwest are well suited for 
a geologic repository. Engineered barriers can be designed 
to contain waste for thousands of years, and the natural 
barriers can delay and dilute any radioactive material that 
migrates from waste packages.98   
In addition to releasing the Viability Assessment, the DOE sought 
independent expert review from Total System Performance Assessment 
(TSPA), a group of well-respected international scientists.99 In November 
2001, TSPA presented a summary of its conclusion: 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 6.  
 93.  See Nuclear Waste Policy Dilemma the First Fifty Years: A Chronology, 
http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/yucca/nwchron1.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2013) (revealing 
the financial incentives given for Nevada to waive its right to object to the Yucca Mountain 
project) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment).  
 94. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 6. 
 95. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 6 (“These tunnels . . . created the world’s largest 
underground laboratory.”).  
 96. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 6–7 (“During this time, more than 2500 scientists 
representing not only DOE and its direct contractors, but also five National Laboratories, the 
U.S. Geological Survey, and dozens of US Universities worked on the project.”). 
 97. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, VIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF A REPOSITORY AT YUCCA 
MOUNTAIN (Dec. 1998), available at 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Yucca_Viability_01_Overview.pdf. 
 98. Id. at 36. 
 99. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 8 (recognizing that DOE gained outside review from 
TSPA, “a joint peer review panel composed of top international experts assembled by the 
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While presenting room for improvement, the TSPA-Site 
Recommendation methodology is soundly based and has 
been implemented in a competent manner. Moreover, the 
modeling incorporates many conservatisms, including the 
extent to which water is able to contact the waste packages, 
the performance of engineered barriers, and retardation 
provided by the geosphere.  
Overall, the International Review Team considers that the 
implemented performance assessment approach provides 
an adequate basis for supporting a statement on likely 
compliance within the regulatory period 10,000 years and, 
accordingly, for the site recommendation decision.100 
 After receiving the endorsement by TSPA and conducting multiple 
reviews, the DOE opened up its work to the public in order to receive 
comments.101 Only after considering and responding to all 17,000 
comments, did the Secretary of Energy finally recommend Yucca Mountain 
to President George W. Bush as the site for the repository.102 The Secretary 
issued the following summary about Yucca Mountain: 
After over 20 years of research and billions of dollars of 
carefully planned and reviewed scientific field work, the 
Department has found that a repository at Yucca Mountain 
brings together the location, natural barriers, and design 
elements most likely to protect the health and safety of the 
public, including those Americans living in the immediate 
vicinity, now and long into the future.103 
 President Bush approved the DOE’s recommendation,104 but in 
April of 2002, the Governor of Nevada vetoed this decision as allowed by 
the NWPA.105 Only a majority vote in the House and the Senate could 
                                                                                                                 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency”). 
 100. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 8 (citing OECD/NEA-IAEA Joint International Peer 
Review of the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project’s Total System Performance 
Assessment Supporting the Site Recommendation Process, 4 (Nov. 2, 2001).  
 101. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 8 (subjecting work on Yucca Mountain to “intensive 
public scrutiny”).  
 102. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 9 (recommending Yucca Mountain after addressing 
all public comments).  
 103. Inholfe, supra note 68, at 9.  
 104.  See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 9 (indicating the President’s approval of the 
Secretary’s recommendation).  
 105. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 9 (indicating Nevada’s Governor veto of Yucca 
Mountain was in accord with the NWPA). 
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override the Governor’s veto.106 After heated debates, Congress achieved 
the votes necessary to override the Governor’s veto with a vote of 306-117 
in the House and 60-39 in the Senate.107 President Bush finally signed the 
approval into law in July 2002 as the Yucca Mountain Development Act 
(YMDA).108  
 While, the YMDA revealed strong Congressional and 
Administrative support of the Yucca Mountain program, the Governor’s 
veto signaled the first of many attempts to halt the repository development 
in Nevada. 
 
B.  Litigation 
 
1.  Nuclear Energy Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency (2004) 
 
 In 2004, “the State of Nevada, local communities, several 
environmental organizations, and the nuclear energy industry” challenged 
the statutory and regulatory framework formed to develop and govern a 
nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit). 109 Among other issues, 
the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the congressional 
selection and presidential and DOE approval of Yucca Mountain for the 
repository site110; this essentially challenged the constitutionality of the 
YMDA. The D.C. Circuit determined that Congress exercised appropriate 
power via Article IV, section 3 of the Constitution. The Court also found 
the President and DOE’s “actions leading to the selection of the Yucca 
Mountain site . . . unreviewable.”111 As a result, the D.C. Circuit affirmed 
the constitutionality of the selection and approval of the Yucca Mountain 
repository. 112  
 The D.C. Circuit rejected all remaining challenges brought by the 
petitioners except Nevada’s challenge to the EPA’s adoption of a 10,000-
                                                                                                                 
 106. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 9 (“In the NWPA’s unprecedented procedure for 
assuring that any site decision received thorough and fair consideration, the Governor’s veto 
could only be overridden by a majority vote in both houses of Congress.”).  
 107. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 9 (indicating vote counts from the House and 
Senate). 
 108. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 9 (revealing that the contentious debates resulted in 
the necessary majority votes from both houses to override the Governor’s veto).  
 109.  Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (listing 
the petitioners and the nature of their challenges).  
 110.  See id. (stating petitioners’ challenge the selection and approval Yucca Mountain 
as the repository site).  
 111.  Id.  
 112.  See, Inholfe, supra note 68, at 9–10 (indicating that the decision conveyed the 
Court’s approval of the constitutionality of the YMDA). 
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year compliance period.113 The compliance period projects the maximum 
amount of radiation exposure that individual members of the public would 
annually receive from the nuclear waste stored in the repository.114 The 
Energy Policy Act (EnPA) requires the EPA to develop “public health and 
safety standards for Yucca Mountain ‘based upon and consistent with the 
findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.’”115 
Such safety standards included adopting a proper compliance period.  
 The NAS recommended a period of about 1 million years because 
it determined that the compliance period should include the time when 
“radiation doses reach their peak.”116 The NAS objected to the 10,000-year 
compliance period because it determined that the shorter period “might be 
inconsistent with protection of public health.”117 Although the EPA 
conceded that it had no scientific basis for capping the compliance period at 
10,000 years, it contended that such a period was appropriate because it 
served certain policy concerns that the NAS did not consider.118 The Court 
did not agree with the EPA and concluded that “the 10,000-year compliance 
period selected by EPA violates . . . the Energy Policy Act (EnPA) because 
it is not, as the EnPA requires, ‘based upon and consistent with’ the 
findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.”119 
As a result, the Court vacated the EPA’s 10,000-year compliance period. 120 
In response to the Court’s ruling, the Nuclear Energy Institute’s Executive 
Vice President Angie Howard said: 
With regard to the EPA compliance period, the court notes 
two possible options. One is simply that the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission revise their regulations to extend the 
compliance period beyond 10,000 years. The other is that 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc., 373 F.3d at 1315 (determining that all challenges 
are without merit except the challenge to the 10,000-year compliance period). 
 114.  See id. at 1267 (explaining that the compliance period was intended to project the 
“maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members of the public from 
releases to the accessible environment from radioactive materials stored . . . in the 
repository”). 
 115.  Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 116.  See id. at 1270–71 (revealing the NAS’s recommendation and the reason for the 
one million year compliance period).  
 117.  See id. at 1271 (expressing concern over the adoption of the 10,000 year period).  
 118.  See id. at 1271–72 (revealing the EPA’s contention that it complied with NAS 
because it considered the NAS recommendation and then promulgated a rule based on that 
recommendation and the policy concerns).  
 119.  Id. at 1257.  
 120. See id.at 1315 (“[W]e vacate 40 C.F.R. part 197 to the extent that it incorporates a 
10,000-year compliance period because . . . that compliance period is not . . . consistent with 
the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. The remaining challenges to the 
EPA rule are without merit.”) 
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Congress could enact legislation empowering EPA to 
deviate from the beyond-10,000 year recommendation of 
the National Academy of Sciences.121 
After the ruling, the EPA developed a new period for evaluating repository 
performance to conform to the NAS’s recommendation of 10,000 out to a 
million years.122  
 Ultimately, the Nuclear Energy Institute case demonstrates that, 
despite opposition and administrative corrections, the Courts, the NAS, 
Congress, and President Bush agreed that the Yucca Mountain project must 
continue.123 
 
2.  New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2012) 
 
 Four states, an Indian community, and environmental groups 
effectively petitioned the D.C. Circuit for a review of the NRC’s 2010 
update to the Waste Confidence Decision (WCD or WCD Update).124 After 
determining that the NRC needed to consider the environmental effects of 
storing nuclear waste on site beyond the expected storage period, the Court 
vacated the December 10, 2010 WCD Update and the storage rule.125 
 
a.  Brief Overview of the WCD and 2010 Amendments 
 
 The NRC produced the original WCD after the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in the 1979 case of Minnesota v. NRC.126 In Minnesota, the Court 
directed the NRC to “consider whether there is reasonable assurance that an 
offsite storage solution for spent fuel will be available by . . . the expiration 
of the plants’ operating licenses, and if not, whether there is reasonable 
assurance that the fuel can be stored safely at the sites beyond those 
                                                                                                                 
 121.  Press Release, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, U.S. Court of Appeals Rejects 
Constitutional Challenge to Yucca Mountain Repository (Jul. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/yuccaappeals (on file with the Washington and Lee 
University Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 122. See U.S. E.P.A., About Yucca Mountain Standards, 
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/yucca/about.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2013) (reflecting the 
EPA’s new evaluation period of 10,000 out to a million years conforms to the requisite 
standards recommend by the NAS) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment).  
 123. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 10 (noting that that top scientists, Congress, the 
President, and the Courts have affirmed the Yucca Mountain program).  
 124.  New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (recognizing that multiple 
parties challenged the 2010 WCD amendment).  
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See id. (citing Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
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dates.”127 The NRC fulfilled the Court’s directive by publishing its findings 
in the WCD in 1984.128 Amendments to two of the finding gave rise to the 
2012 action.129  
 The 1984 WCD contained five “Waste Confidence Findings.” 130 
Finding 1 provided that safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a mined 
geologic repository was technically possible.131 Finding 2 declared that a 
repository would be available by 2007–2009.132 Finding 3 assured the safe 
management of waste until the availability of the repository.133 Finding 4 
indicated that spent nuclear fuel could remain safely stored on nuclear plant 
sites for at least thirty years beyond each plant’s licensed life.134 Finding 5 
declared that independent storage would be available if needed.135 These 
Findings served as a framework to ensure the safe on-site storage of spent 
nuclear fuel and the future availability of a permanent repository.  
 In 1990, the NRC updated Finding 2 in the WCD to include its 
estimate that a repository would be available by 2025 instead of 2009.136 
Although the NRC reviewed the WCD in 1999, it did not alter it.137  
 In 2010, after receiving public comments, the NRC revised 
Findings 2 and 4 of the Waste Confidence Findings in the WCD.138 In 
Finding 2, the NRC omitted its previous projection that a repository would 
be available by 2025 and declared that a repository would be available 
“when necessary.”139 In support of this ambiguous projection, the NRC 
pointed to its evaluation of the “political and technical obstacles to 
permanent storage,” and its conclusion that a permanent storage option 
would be available when temporary storage became insufficient.140 
 In 2010, the NRC also amended Finding 4 to allow nuclear plants 
to store spent nuclear fuel on site for 60 years beyond a plant’s licensed 
                                                                                                                 
 127.  Id. at 474–75.  
 128.  Id. at 474–75.  
 129.  Id. at 475.  
 130.  Id. (discussing the findings of the Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 
34,658, 34,659–60 (Aug. 31, 1984)).  
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id.  
 133. Id. 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id.; Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658, 34,659–60 (Aug. 31, 1984).  
 136.  See Waste Confidence Decision Review, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,474, 38,505 (Sept. 18, 
1990) (predicting the availability of a repository in 2025, based upon “new understandings 
about waste disposal”).  
 137.  See New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that the NRC 
reviewed the WCD in 1999 but did not change it).  
 138.  Id; Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,037 (Dec. 23, 2010).  
 139.  See NRC, 681 F.3d at 475 (editing Finding 2 by eliminating the projected date of 
2025).  
 140.  Id. 
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life;141 licensed life includes 20-year life extensions, which the NRC has 
and will grant to many plants.142 The Commission determined that the spent 
fuel would not have “significant environmental impacts for at least 60 years 
beyond the licensed life for operation.”143 The NRC determined that 
potential leaks from spent-fuel storage pools144 and the low possibility of 
storage pool fires did not pose a dangerous threat to the environment.145 In 
addition, the Commission committed to forming a plan for longer-term 
storage while conducting an evaluation of environmental impacts of on-site 
storage beyond the new 60-year period.146 The environmental impact 
findings for the new 60-year period were still pending during this case.147  
 
b.  The Arguments 
 
 The petitioners contended that the NRC violated the National 
Environment Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) by failing to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before amending the WCD.148 
Before taking a “major federal action significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment,” NEPA requires all federal agencies to issue a 
report, or EIS, detailing the environmental consequences associated with 
the action.149 NEPA’s purpose is to ensure “fully informed and well-
considered decision making.”150 The NRC argued that the WCD 
amendments did not constitute the requisite “major federal action.”151 Even 
                                                                                                                 
 141.  See id. (amending Finding 4 to allow the storage of spent nuclear fuel on nuclear 
plant sites for up to 60 years beyond the plant’s license expiration).  
 142. See U.S. N.R.C., Fact Sheet on Reactor License Renewal (June 2012), available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-reactor-license-renewal.pdf 
(explaining the license renewal process and the plants that have petitioned for and received 
renewals).  
 143.  See New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (indicating that the 
NRC altered Fining 4 by increasing the time allowed for spent nuclear fuel to be stored on 
nuclear reactor sites from 30 years to 60 years); Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 81,037, 38 (Dec. 23, 2010).  
 144.  See NRC, 681 F.3d at 475 (demonstrating that the NRC believes it regulatory 
scheme is sufficient to reduce the potential health risks associated with an increased period 
for on-site storage).  
 145.  See id. (concluding that “pool fires are sufficiently unlikely as to pose no 
significant environmental threat”). 
 146.  See id. (reflecting the NRC’s commitment to “developing a plan for longer-term 
storage” and assessing “environmental impact of storage beyond the sixty-year post-license 
period”); Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,040 (Dec. 23, 2010).  
 147.  See NRC, 681 F.3d at 483 (revealing that the NRC is currently conducting an EIS 
regarding the sixty-year period).  
 148.  See id. at 476 (summarizing petitioners’ claim that NRC violated NEPA).  
 149. See id. (stating the NEPA requirement at issue in the case).  
 150.  See id. (describing purpose of NEPA).  
 151.  See id. (arguing that amending the WCD is not a ‘major federal action’ under 
NEPA).  
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if it had taken action that triggered NEPA requirements, the NRC 
contended that its findings constituted an Environmental Assessment (EA) 
with a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), which makes an EIS 
unnecessary.152 The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the NRC.153
 The Court determined that the NRC’s amendments to the WCD 
constituted a major federal action requiring an EIS or a FONSI.154 The 
Court stated that the Commission’s assertion that the WCD serves as an 
EA155 does not satisfy the requirements of NEPA.156 The Court correctly 
reasoned that the NRC’s assurance that a permanent storage option would 
be available “when necessary” could not be interpreted to mean that the 
possibility of a repository not being available was so low that researching 
the environmental impact of not having a repository was unnecessary.157 
The Court concluded that the NRC needed to take into account the 
environmental effects of not developing a repository.158  
 The D.C. Circuit also determined that the NRC needed to “look 
forward to examine the effect of the additional time in storage, as well as 
examining past leaks in a manner that would allow the Commission to rule 
out the possibility that those leaks were only harmless because of site-
specific factors or even sheer luck.”159 The NRC’s revision to Finding 4 
contained no analysis of the possible effects of such leaks over the 60-year 
period; rather, the NRC relied on the conclusion that past leaks produced 
“negligible near-term health effects.”160 
 The Court ruled that the NRC did not meet NEPA’s requirements 
and vacated the WCD Update.161 In doing so, the Court acknowledged that 
                                                                                                                 
 152.  See id. (reasoning that the its assessments are sufficient and an EIS is not 
required).  
 153.  See id. (indicating that the Court agrees with the petitioners).   
 154.  Id. at 476.  
 155.  The EA must conclude with a finding of no significant environmental impact 
(FONSI) in order to preclude an EIS. See id. at 478 (describing an EA, a FONSI, and an 
EIS).  
 156.  See id. at 478‒79 (assuming that the WCD is an EA “for the permanent storage 
conclusion . . . the EA is insufficient because a finding that ‘reasonable assurance exists that 
sufficient mined geologic repository capacity will be available when necessary,’ does not 
describe a probability of failure so low as to dismiss the potential consequences of such a 
failure”).  
 157.  Id.  
 158.  Concluding that the NRC failed to examine the environmental impact of not 
opening a repository, the Court stated that “[a]n agency may find no significant impact if the 
probability is so low as to be ‘remote and speculative,’ or if the combination of probability 
and harm is sufficiently minimal.” Id at 479. 
 159.  Id. at 481.  
 160.  See id. at 481 (revealing that the NRC did not take into account the possibility that 
future leaks could be more dangerous than past leaks).  
 161.  See id. at 483 (vacating the WCD Update and signaling that the NRC “must 
conduct a true EA regarding the extension of temporary storage”).  
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the Commission’s future production of the EIS concerning environmental 
impacts of on-site storage beyond the 60-year period might address the 
shortcomings exposed in the current case.162 For the present time, however, 
the NRC lacked the needed research and information to substantiate its 
changes to the WCD. As a result, the Court vacated the WCD Update.163 
In response to this ruling, the NRC has developed a schedule and is 
working to comply with the Court’s decision.  
 
C.  Politics Clash with Repository Development 
 
 After six years of preparation, the DOE submitted its 8,600 page 
license application for Yucca Mountain to the NRC on June 3, 2008.164 The 
Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman stated that he was confident that the 
NRC would validate the Yucca Mountain repository.165 The NWPA gave 
the NRC three years to review the license application.166 In March 2010, 
less than two years after filing the application, the DOE filed a motion to 
withdraw the license application from the NRC.167 The following events 
best explain this seemingly unexpected move. 
 During the 2008 Democratic presidential primary election, then 
Senator Barack Obama united with Senator Harry Reid and pledged to “end 
the notion of Yucca Mountain.”168 Upon his 2008 presidential election, 
                                                                                                                 
 162.  See id. (recognizing that “some or all of the problems here may be addressed” 
when the NRC conducts the required assessment of environmental impacts). 
 163.  Id. 
 164. U.S. N.R.C., DOE’s License Application For A High-Level Waste Geologic 
Repository at Yucca Mountain (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-
disposal/yucca-lic-app.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). 
 165. See Press Release, Samuel W. Bodman, Sec’y of Energy, Yucca Mountain Press 
Conference (June 3, 2008), available at http://www.id. 
doe.gov/news/PressReleases/PR080603-YuccaSam/YuccaMountainPressConference.pdf 
(“We are confident that the NRC’s rigorous review process will validate that the Yucca 
Mountain repository will provide for the safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste in a way that protects human health and our environment.”).  
 166. See U.S. N.R.C., Fact Sheet on Licensing Yucca Mountain (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-yucca-license-review.html 
[hereinafter Licensing Yucca Mountain] (verifying that that Congress set a three-year 
schedule for the NRC to review the license application and reach a decision on whether to 
improve construction of the repository) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 167. Motion to withdraw, In re DOE (High Level Waste Repository), No. 63-001-HLW 
(A.S.L.B.P. Mar. 3, 2010) available at 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/DOE_Motion_to_Withdraw.pdf [hereinafter 
Motion to Withdraw]. 
 168. See Editorial, Where Does It All Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at A26 
(indicating that then-Senator Obama pledged to end the Yucca Mountain development as did 
Nevada Senator Harry Reid); see also, Megan Easley, Standing in Nuclear Waste: 
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President Obama cut most of the funding for the project in his 2009 budget 
proposal.169 Making his intention to ‘end the project’ clearer, President 
Obama appointed Senator Reid’s former aide, Gregory Jaczko, to be the 
Chairman of the NRC and Steven Chu as Secretary of Energy.170 President 
Obama, Secretary Chu, and the DOE resolved to withdraw the Yucca 
Mountain application, and in March 2010, the DOE attempted to withdraw 
the Yucca Mountain license application from the NRC’s review with 
prejudice.171  
 The NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) denied the 
motion to withdraw the application with prejudice.172 Dismissing the 
license application with prejudice would likely prevent future review of the 
application.173 Supporting its petition to withdraw the application, the DOE 
simply stated that in regards to policy the site was “not a workable 
option.”174 Despite the DOE’s objections, the ASLB continued to evaluate 
the license application for Yucca Mountain because the ASLB determined 
that Congress had clearly instructed the DOE to file a license application 
and directed the NRC to review the application and reach a decision.175 The 
                                                                                                                 
Challenging the Disposal of Yucca Mountain, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 672–73 (Mar. 2012) 
(discussing President Obama and Harry Reid’s agreement to end the Yucca Mountain 
project).  
 169. See Wald, supra note 4, at A1 (revealing that President Obama’s 2009 budget 
proposal reduced much of the funding for the Yucca Mountain project).  
 170. See Mary Manning, Obama Names Ex-Reid Aide to Lead Nuclear Commission, 
LAS VEGAS SUN, May 13, 2009, available at http:// 
www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/may/13/former-reid-aide-likely-lead-nuclear-commission/ 
(indicating that Jaczko’s appointment will hinder the construction of a repository at Yucca 
Mountain). 
 171. See Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository, WASH. OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/page.aspx?id=27624#.UPYXjidEGws (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (“In 
January 2010, President Obama, Secretary Chu and DOE determined they would withdraw 
with prejudice the application submitted by DOE to the NRC for a license to construct a 
permanent repository at Yucca Mountain . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also Motion To Withdraw, supra 
note 168 (recalling the DOE’s intention to withdraw the Yucca Mountain License 
Application).  
 172. See Todd Garvey, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41675, CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN: 
LITIGATION ASSOCIATED WITH ATTEMPTS TO ABANDON THE PLANNED NUCLEAR WASTE 
REPOSITORY 7–8 (June 4, 2012) [hereinafter CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN] (indicating the 
ASLB’s rejection of the DOE’s attempt to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license 
application).  
 173.  See id. at 8 (dismissing with prejudice generally bars an application from being re-
filed in the future).  
 174. See DOE’s Reply to the Responses to the Motion To Withdraw, In re DOE (High 
Level Waste Repository), No. 63-001-HLW (A.S.L.B.P May 27, 2010), available at http:// 
www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/licensing/doe100527response.pdf (arguing that Yucca Mountain 
“is not a workable option”).  
 175. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 § 114(b), 42 U.S.C. § 10134(b) 
(2006) (“Secretary shall submit to the Commission an application for a construction 
REVISITING THE NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE PROBLEM              381 
exchange between the DOE and the ASLB prompted the DOE to appeal the 
ASLB decision to the NRC.176 The NRC received briefs from the parties 
addressing the issue of whether the Commission should stand behind the 
ASLB’s decision or reverse it.177 After reviewing the briefs, the NRC held a 
vote that resulted in 2-2 tie with one member abstaining.178 Although the tie 
vote meant that the ASLB decision stands, the NRC directed the licensing 
panel to close its review of Yucca Mountain by September 30, 2011, 
possibly because of the lack of federal funding for the project.179  
 Even though the NRC decided to halt the repository development 
process at Yucca Mountain, the 2-2 vote failed to uphold or reject the 
ASLB’s decision on the legal status of Yucca Mountain.180 Senator Harry 
Reid stated, “[t]oday’s decision by the NRC brings the Yucca Mountain 
saga closer to its final conclusion.”181 In contrast, Congressman Fred Upton 
of Michigan said, “[t]oday’s action means the Yucca Mountain license 
application remains alive.”182 As a result, the legal status of the Yucca 
Mountain program remained uncertain even though the NRC directed the 
licensing panel to stop working on the project.183 
  
D.  The Judiciary Does Not Resolve Yucca Mountain’s Status 
 
 While the DOE and NRC were involved in adjudicatory 
proceedings regarding the issue,184 states and citizens sued in the D.C. 
                                                                                                                 
authorization for a repository at such site . . . .”); see also, U.S.D.O.E., No. LBP-10-11, slip 
op. at 5; see also NWPA § 114(d), 42 U.S.C. § 10134(d) (“Commission shall consider an 
application for a construction authorization for all or part of a repository . . . .”). 
 176. See Licensing Yucca Mountain, supra note 167 (indicating that the DOE appealed 
the ASLB’s decision to the NRC).  
 177. See Tom Gottshall & Ross Shealy, PowerPoint presentation, Yucca Mountain 
Litigation—Aiken County, available at 
http://cab.srs.gov/library/meetings/2012/fb/09yucca.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2013) 
(indicating the NRC’s review of briefs by both parties).  
 178.  See Tetreault, supra note 6 (noting the 2-2 vote in the NRC).  
 179. See Tetreault, supra note 6 (revealing that the “Obama administration had 
requested Congress zero out the NRC’s work on Yucca, as it had previously terminated 
funding and closed shop at the [DOE]”); see also Licensing Yucca Mountain, supra note 167 
(confirming the decision to close review on Yucca Mountain). 
 180.  See Tetreault, supra note 6 (indicating that the 2-2 vote in the NRC did not reject 
or uphold the ASLB’s decision). 
 181.  See Tetreault, supra note 6.  
 182.  See Tetreault, supra note 6.  
 183.  See Tetreault, supra note 6 (acknowledging that the legal status of Yucca 
Mountain remained uncertain but recognizing that the effect of the ruling made it very 
difficult for the development of Yucca Mountain to be started again).  
 184.  See Tetreault, supra note 6 (indicating that the agency proceedings were separate 
from the judicial proceedings).  
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Circuit contesting the DOE’s motion to withdraw the application.185 In the 
case of In re Aiken County, the Court determined that the challenges to the 
DOE’s attempt to withdraw the license application were not ripe, and the 
DOE’s announcement that it would terminate the repository process did not 
constitute final agency action.186 
 In August 2012, the Court responded to a petition for Writ of 
Mandamus and ordered “that [In re Aiken County] be held in abeyance and 
that the parties . . . file updates on the status of Fiscal Year 2013 
appropriations with respect to the issues presented.”187 The D.C. Circuit’s 
decision to postpone review gave Congress and the Administration an 
opportunity to address the nuclear waste storage issue.  
 
IV.  Signs of Progress 
 
A.  2012 and 2013 Legislative Dialogue Regarding Nuclear Waste Storage 
 
 Recognizing the need to develop a solution for spent nuclear fuel 
storage, Congress returned to the nuclear waste discussions in 2012.188 New 
Mexico Senator Jeff Bingaman proposed a bill that would implement the 
major recommendations of the BRC,189 which included a consent-based 
approach to the siting of one or more short-term storage sites and geological 
repositories.190 One of the most controversial parts of the bill, which 
departed from the recommendations of the BRC, stated that a link must 
exist between a temporary “storage facility and an agreement on a 
permanent geological repository.”191 The linkage provision deterred 
potential co-sponsors from endorsing the bill, but Bingaman refused to de-
link the temporary and permanent storage sites because he feared that a 
temporary site could become a de facto repository.192  
                                                                                                                 
 185. See In re Aiken County, 645 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (seeking review of motion 
to withdraw license). 
 186. See id. at 437 (determining that the case was not ripe for review).  
 187. In re Aiken County, No 11-1271, Nuclear Reg. Rep. P 20,728 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 
2012). 
 188.  See Richard M. Jones, Forward Step: Senate Bill on Nuclear Waste, FYI: THE AIP 
BULLETIN OF SCIENCE POLICY NEWS (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.aip.org/fyi/2012/133.html 
[hereinafter Forward Step] (reviewing a 2012 congressional committee hearing concerning 
legislation that sought to provide plan for permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 189.  See id. (indicating that Senator “Bingaman’s bill would implement the major 
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission”).  
 190. See id. (pursuing a consent-based approach to selecting a site for a repository).  
 191.  See id. (revealing the disagreement caused by linking the selection of an interim 
storage facility to a permanent waste disposal site in the proposed bill).  
 192.  See id. (stating Bingaman’s concern that the selection of an interim storage option 
without a permanent option could cause the interim option to become de facto permanent).  
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 Also in 2012, the U.S. Senate Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee (ENRC) conducted a hearing on the proposed bill.193 The DOE 
Assistant Secretary testified that “[t]he Administration supports working 
with Congress to develop a consent-based process that is transparent, 
adaptive, and technically sound.”194 Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) Senior Project Attorney Geoffrey Fettus told the ENRC that the 
NRDC supports the bill’s linkage of a temporary storage site to a geologic 
repository.195  
 Constellation Energy Nuclear Group President and CEO Henry 
Barron told the ENRC that Bingaman’s bill lacked needed changes but 
provided “a positive start.”196 Speaking as a representative of the Nuclear 
Energy Institute (NEI), Barron urged the ENRC to direct the NRC to 
continue the licensing process for Yucca Mountain.197 Although the federal 
government would have to pay utility companies billions of dollars in 
damages for not providing storage for spent nuclear fuel, Barron asserted 
that a storage option provided by the federal government would influence 
utilities to settle their claims against the government in lieu of suing for 
damages.198 While Barron supported a temporary storage site, he warned 
the ENRC that consolidating the storage of spent fuel provides only a 
temporary solution, and creating a geologic repository is vital for 
permanent storage.199  
 Congress did not vote on Bingaman’s bill before the end of the 
112th session in 2012, but Congress is expected to take action on this bill or 
a similar one during the 113th session in 2013.200 In February 2013, Senator 
Ron Wyden, the ENRC Chairman, predicted that Congress would draft a 
nuclear waste storage bill by the end of the session.201 
                                                                                                                 
 193.  See id. (providing a summary of the hearing).  
 194.  Id. (quoting DOE Assistant Secretary Lyons on the consent-based approach). 
 195.  See id. (citing statements of support by Fettus). 
 196.  Id. (quoting Constellation Energy Nuclear Group President and CEO Henry 
Barron). 
 197.  See id. (urging the Committee to finish developing the Yucca Mountain 
repository).  
 198.  See id. (acknowledging that the federal government owes billions of dollars in 
damages to utilities who would likely settle the their if the government could provide a 
suitable storage option for spent nuclear fuel).  
 199.  See id. (cautioning the Committee that a consolidated storage site would provide a 
temporary solution but would not eliminate the need for a permanent storage option).  
 200.  See id. (indicating that Congress is expected to continue to discuss and possibly 
pass legislation regarding a storage option in the 113th session).  
 201.  See Sen. Wyden Expects Draft Nuclear Waste Bill ‘Shortly’, E2 WIRE: THE HILL’S 
ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT BLOG (Feb. 27, 2013 3:20 P.M. EST) http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-
wire/e2-wire/285319-sen-wyden-expects-draft-nuclear-waste-bill-shortly (noting Senator 
Wyden’s expectation that a nuclear waste bill will be drafted by the end of this congressional 
session) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and 
Environment).  
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B.  The Obama Administration Articulates a Strategy for Storing Nuclear 
Waste 
 
 On January 11, 2013, the DOE announced that it plans to have “a 
pilot facility for the interim storage of used fuel from shutdown reactor sites 
operational by 2021,” “a larger interim storage facility by 2025,” and “a 
final geologic repository by 2048.”202 This announcement reflects the 
Administration’s view about nuclear waste storage as detailed in the DOE’s 
report, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel 
and High-Level Radioactive Waste.203 The report revealed the DOE’s 
strategy for “transporting, storing, and disposing of [spent] nuclear fuel.”204 
The DOE published this report in response to the recommendations 
provided by the BRC,205 which the Secretary of Energy received on January 
26, 2012.206 The three main themes of the report include system design, 
consent-based facilities siting, and governance and funding.207 The sub-
sections that follow summarize these themes.  
 
1.  Recommended System Designs 
 
 The Obama Administration articulated its support for a nuclear 
waste management system that included:  
• A pilot interim storage facility with limited capacity 
capable of accepting used nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste and initially focused on serving shut-
down reactor sites;  
                                                                                                                 
 202.  Industry Welcomes DOE Used Fuel Management Strategy, NUCLEAR ENERGY 
OVERVIEW, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (Jan. 11‒17, 2013), available at 
http://www.ibewlu220.com/documents/CPNPP-NEO/01-18-2013.pdf.  
 203.  Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 2.  
 204.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 1 (characterizing the report as “a framework for moving toward a sustainable program 
to deploy an integrated system capable of transporting, storing, and disposing of used 
nuclear fuel . . . .”).  
 205.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 5 (“The Strategy . . . serves as a statement of Administration policy regarding the 
importance of addressing the disposition of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste . . . . [I]t presents the Administration’s response to the final report and 
recommendations made by the Blue Ribbon Commission . . . .”). 
 206.  See Report to the Sec’y of Energy, BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AMERICA’S 
NUCLEAR FUTURE (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/BRC_FinalReport_Jan2012.pdf 
(identifying the date of transmittal to Energy Secretary Chu). 
 207.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 4 (revealing the Administration’s key strategy elements in Figure 1).  
REVISITING THE NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE PROBLEM              385 
• A larger, consolidated interim storage facility, 
potentially co-located with the pilot facility and/or 
with a geologic repository, that provides the needed 
flexibility in the waste management system and allows 
for important near-term progress in implementing the 
federal commitment; and 
• A permanent geologic repository for the disposal of 
used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.208 
The Administration decided that an incremental implementation of a 
flexible system provided the best approach because it ensures safety and 
“gain[s] trust among stakeholders.”209  
 
2.  Consent-based Facilities Siting 
 
 The Administration’s consent-based approach requires agreement 
at several jurisdiction levels and transparent communication of the benefits 
and risks of hosting an interim storage site or a repository.210 Although 
Congress must define what constitutes consent,211 the proposed consent-
based approach seems to provide an equitable way for the government to 
work with local communities to develop both interim storage facilities and 
a permanent repository.212 In reality, however, this approach may create 
more challenges than expected. For instance, opponents of nuclear energy 
may use the consent requirement as an opportunity to persuade 
communities to reject a nuclear waste storage site. If Nevada’s opposition 
to Yucca Mountain serves as an indicator, gaining the requisite public 
support may become the highest hurdle for the federal government to 
overcome in selecting and developing interim storage and repository sites. 
 If the government does not gain the requisite amount of consent 
from potential host communities, Congress must provide an alternative 
process for identifying, evaluating, and developing nuclear waste storage 
                                                                                                                 
 208.  Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 2, at 
4.  
 209.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 4 (“The objective is to implement a flexible waste management system incrementally in 
order to ensure safe and secure operations, gain trust among stakeholders, and adapt 
operations based on lessons learned.”).  
 210.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 4 (summarizing the strategy of consent-based facility siting in Figure 1).  
 211.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 9 (acknowledging that Congress must define consent and determine how much consent 
is required).  
 212.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 9 (characterizing the host communities as ‘partners’ with the federal government during 
the siting processes). 
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sites. For instance, Congress could consider purchasing land from states or 
individuals to develop a storage site.  
 
3.  Governance & Funding 
 
 Adopting the recommendation of the BRC, The Administration 
supports the creation of a new waste management and disposal organization 
(MDO) to ensure “stability, focus, and credibility to build public trust and 
confidence.”213 Ultimately, the MDO’s responsibilities would include 
managing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel.214 The Administration did 
not provide details regarding these responsibilities and the MDO’s power, 
but the Administration plans to work with Congress to ensure that the MDO 
has the requisite authority to carry out its mission.215 
 According to the DOE’s report, the funding for the MDO should 
come from the “past and future fee receipts and accrued interest” resulting 
from the fees established under the NWPA.216 Although Congress passed 
budgeting acts that disconnected “the revenues from the expenditures 
necessary for a waste solution,”217 the Administration proposed changing 
the budgeting acts to redirect the revenue collected from the energy fees to 
cover the expenses associated with nuclear waste disposal.218 After 
outlining its preferred changes, the Administration determined that “[a]ny 
new funding structure . . . will need to balance increased funding flexibility 
and rigorous spending oversight to help assure that the program is 
implemented in the most cost-effective manner possible, while still holding 
the MDO accountable to the President and Congress.”219 Additional details 
regarding funding are expected to appear in the President’s fiscal year 2014 
                                                                                                                 
 213.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 9 (reflecting the Administration’s support of the BRC’s recommendation of creating a 
new organization to manage waste disposal).  
 214.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 10 (providing an overview of the MDO’s responsibilities). 
 215.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 10 (indicating the Administration’s willingness to work with Congress to apportion 
appropriate powers to the MDO).  
 216.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 11 (funding the MDO through revenue raised through fees established under the 
NWPA).  
 217.  Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 2, at 
11.  
 218.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 11 (expressing the Administration’s desire to reform the budgeting acts in order to 
supplement the cost of disposing of the radioactive waste). 
 219.  Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 2, at 
12.  
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budget proposal;220 however, such details must also address whether the 
funds in the NWF will be used only for expenditures associated with 
nuclear waste storage, or whether the funds will be used for ancillary 
expenditures not mentioned in the NWPA.  
 The Administration’s response to the BRC’s recommendation 
signals significant progress in developing a workable solution to spent 
nuclear fuel storage. As the recent past demonstrated, however, many 
obstacles remain in the way of interim storage and repository development. 
Despite these challenges, the federal government must forge ahead and 
develop both interim and permanent sites to store spent nuclear fuel.  
 
V.  The Next Step: Passing Legislation and Gaining Community Support 
 
A.  Congressional Action 
 
 By issuing its formal statement and strategy for storing nuclear 
waste, the Obama Administration passed the ball to Congress. Now 
Congress must adopt legislation to move the nation closer to opening a 
permanent storage site for spent nuclear fuel. Among other issues, the 
legislation should address the linkage matter and provide an alternative to 
the consent-based site selection. Because past delays and setbacks derailed 
repository development, Congress should deal with the entire storage 
problem by linking an interim storage option with a permanent repository. 
This linkage would ensure that the interim storage site does not become a 
de facto repository, as Senator Bingaman and NEI Spokesperson Henry 
Barron feared.221 Although a linkage provision provides an ideal solution to 
developing waste storage sites, Congress should also provide an alternative 
process for developing interim storage sites if the linkage provision causes 
significant delay.  
 Along with providing a definition for consent, or community 
support, Congress should provide an alternative process that allows the 
DOE to file an application with the NRC for repository development if the 
government fails to gain the requisite level of consent. This alternative 
process should be specific and leave little discretion to the agencies. Such a 
process will guard against changing political powers that could prematurely 
terminate a permanent storage site’s development.  
 Congress should also reconsider the Yucca Mountain site. Decades 
of research and billions of dollars of development have indicated that the 
                                                                                                                 
 220.  See Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 
2, at 13 (“The President’s fiscal year 2014 budget will include additional details regarding 
funding for the program of work in this Strategy document.”). 
 221. See Forward Step, supra note 189 (discussing Senator Bingaman’s concerns that 
no permanent solution would be reached). 
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Nevada site contains the requisite qualities for safely storing radioactive 
waste.222 Because such research and study rendered Yucca Mountain the 
best site for storing nuclear waste in the United States,223 its reopening 
merits strong consideration. Influential members of the House of 
Representatives have expressed their desire to see the Yucca Mountain 
project continued.224 Speaker of the House John Boehner expressed his 
desire to see the program revived, contending, “[w]e’ve invested tens of 
billions of dollars in a storage facility that’s as safe as anything we’re going 
to find.”225 Although some Congressmen openly support the Yucca 
Mountain project, the reopening of the project will only result from a 
bipartisan effort between the House, Senate, and the Administration. 
 The Yucca Mountain debate will continue to unfold before the 
NRC, in the D.C. Circuit, and between politicians in the years ahead.226 The 
new NRC Chairman, succeeding Chairman Jaczko,227 could have a 
substantial effect on the future of the Nevada site.228 Since her confirmation 
in June 2012,229 NRC Chairman Allison Macfarlane230 received a positive 
evaluation from members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works.231 Committee Chairman Senator Barbara Boxer said, 
“I’m really happy to see the cooperation and respect” among the NRC and 
                                                                                                                 
 222.  See generally CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN, supra note 173 (chronicling the time 
and money that has been invested in the Yucca Mountain project).  
 223. See Inholfe, supra note 68, at 8–9 (determining that Yucca Mountain was best site 
for the repository).  
 224. See CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN, supra note 173, at 28 (listing the chairpersons of 
the House Budget Committee, House Natural Resources Committee, and House Committee 
on Science, Space, and Technology among those who oppose the termination of the Yucca 
Mountain project).  
 225.  See CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN, supra note 173, at 28 (citing Statement by Rep. 
John Boehner to the City Club of Cleveland (August 24, 2010)).  
 226. See CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN, supra note 173, at 28 (recognizing that the Yucca 
Mountain controversy will unfold in the NRC, D.C. Circuit, and politically).  
 227. See John Broder & Matthew Wald, Chairman, NRC to Resign Under Fire, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2012, at A13 (revealing that Chairman Jaczko’s resignation in Mary 2012 is 
effective upon the appointment of his successor). 
 228.  See CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN, supra note 173, at 28 (acknowledging that 
“changes in the makeup of the NRC may also have significant impact on the future of Yucca 
Mountain”). 
 229.  Richard Jones, Congeniality and Collaboration: Senate Hearing on New 
Leadership at the NRC, FYI: THE AIP BULLETIN OF SCIENCE POLICY NEWS (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://www.aip.org/fyi/2012/137.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 230.  See CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN, supra note 173, at 28 (listing Macfarlane as a 
“former member of the Blue Ribbon Commission and an associate professor of 
environmental science and policy at George Mason University”). 
 231.  See Jones, Congeniality and Collaboration, supra note 230 (revealing that the 
Committee looked forward to a collaborative relationship with the new NRC Chairman).  
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the Senators.232 Although some recognize Chairman Macfarlane as a Yucca 
Mountain critic,233 only time will tell if the cooperation between the NRC 
and Senate will result in legislation that solves the nuclear waste storage 
problem.   
 
B.  Gaining Public Support 
 
 Because both the DOE’s report and Senator Bingaman’s bill 
support a consent-based storage option for nuclear waste,234 gaining public 
and local support will be crucial for the development of both interim and 
permanent storage sites. Although public opinion of nuclear energy rested 
on shaky ground after the Fukushima Daiichi plant failure,235 a March 2012 
poll indicated that 77 percent believed that nuclear energy would be 
“important in meeting the [United States’] future electricity needs.”236 Of 
those polled, 80 percent believe that the federal government needs to 
develop a permanent nuclear waste disposal site.237 In regards to a 
temporary storage site, 62 percent agreed that fuel could be safely stored 
on-site, but 78 percent agreed that one or two storage sites are preferable for 
storing spent fuel.238 Public opinion seems to support the development of a 
federal repository; however, the real test will entail garnering enough local 
support to approve repository development.  
 As the DOE’s 2013 report states, “[p]ublic trust and confidence is a 
prerequisite to the success of the overall effort . . . therefore, public 
perceptions must be addressed regarding the program’s ability to transport, 
store, and dispose of used nuclear fuel . . . in a manner that is protective of 
the public’s health, safety, and security and protective of the 
environment.”239   
 
                                                                                                                 
 232.  See Jones, Congeniality and Collaboration, supra note 230.  
 233.  See CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN, supra note 173, at 28 (recognizing that some 
consider Chairman MacFarlane a critic of the Yucca Mountain program).  
 234.  See Forward Step, supra note 189 (recommending a consent-based approach); see 
also Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 2, at 9 
(proposing a consent-based approach).  
 235.  See Michael Cooper & Dalia Sussman, Nuclear Power Loses Support in New Poll, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2011, at A15 (indicating that public support of nuclear power 
diminished after the Fukushima accident). 
 236.  See Gradual Growth in U.S. Support for Nuclear, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (Sept. 
24, 2012), http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-
Gradual_growth_in_US_support_for_nuclear-2409124.html (listing the results of the poll) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 237.  Id.  
 238.  Id.  
 239.  Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 2, at 
9. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
 The Congressional dialogue regarding the nuclear waste storage 
issue and the Obama Administration’s response to the BRC 
recommendations set forth in Part IV, supra, demonstrate that the federal 
government realizes the importance of developing a permanent storage site 
for spent nuclear fuel. By working together in a bipartisan manner, 
Congress can implement an effective strategy for removing spent nuclear 
fuel from plant sites to interim storage sites, and eventually to permanent 
storage sites.  
 First, Congress should seriously consider the strategies proposed in 
the DOE’s 2013 report and the plan articulated in former Senator 
Bingaman’s bill. Both the report and bill contain plausible strategies for 
resolving the nuclear waste storage problem and provide an informative 
starting point for Congress. Second, Congress should consider reopening 
the Yucca Mountain program. Both the federal government and scientific 
opinion recognized Yucca Mountain as the best site for safely storing 
nuclear waste. This option should be reconsidered because of its scientific 
merits and because the government has already invested decades of 
research and billions of dollars in ensuring the workability of this option.  
 The rapid cessation of the Yucca Mountain development 
demonstrated how quickly a long-term storage plan could end prematurely. 
The Yucca Mountain project should inform Congress’ decisions as it drafts 
new nuclear waste storage legislation. For instance, Congress should create 
“safeguards” in its new legislation to prevent the termination of nuclear 
storage site development, except for legitimate health and safety risks. One 
safeguard should require the DOE to produce sufficient evidence of threats 
to health and safety before the DOE can withdraw a repository license 
application from NRC review. Such safeguards will help our nation move 
forward with a decisive storage plan that will not result in lost time and 
wasted development funds. While Yucca Mountain may eventually store 
spent nuclear fuel, it currently serves as an example of a wasted option. 
Congress and the Administration must work together to develop an 
enduring storage solution. Now is the time for collaboration. Now is the 
time to solve the nuclear waste storage problem. 
